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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL
DISTRESS IN MONTANA
Carl Tobias·
I. INTRODUCTION

The independent cause of action for the intentional infliction
of mental distress (IIMD) in substantive tort law has enjoyed a
short, somewhat confused history in the United States and in
Montana. California became the first state to recognize this
freestanding cause of action in the landmark 1952 decision of
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff. 1 Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States now recognize the intentional infliction cause of action.
In several recent opinions, the Montana Supreme Court
indicated its willingness to recognize the independent tort, even
as the court stated that no plaintiff had presented a factual situation which would satisfy the elements of the cause of action. 2
In the 1995 case of Sacco v. High Country Independent Press,
Inc., 3 the Montana Supreme Court held that an "independent
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will
arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional
distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's intentional act or omission. "4
The Montana Supreme Court's Sacco opinion improved,
principally by clarifying, the law of IIMD in Montana in several
important respects. For example, the court correctly recognized
the existence of an independent cause of action and properly
clarified the meaning of the severe emotional distress element of
the claim by relying substantially on the definition included in
comment j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Notwithstanding the Montana Supreme Court's comprehensive
treatment of the intentional infliction of mental distress tort and

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Bari Burke, Peggy Sanner, Justin Stark, and the first year torts class at the University of Montana
for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this
piece, and Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
2. See, e.g., Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 117, 835 P.2d 720 (1992);
Doohan v. Bigfork Sch. Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 805 P.2d 1354 (1991); see also
Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411, 426-27
(1995).
3. 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411 (1995).
4. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428.
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its careful attempt to clarify the applicable law, some confusion
remains.
With all due respect for the valuable efforts of the court, I
believe that there is a preferable approach to this complicated
area of substantive tort law. The solution that I proffer is the
recognition of an independent cause of action for IIMD which
relies on the elements of the tort that comprise the cause of
action in the majority of American jurisdictions: the plaintiff
would be required to show that the defendant engaged in unpermitted, intentional, extremely outrageous conduct which caused
the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
The two critical constituents of the cause of action should be
articulated in terms of the concepts prescribed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which courts in the overwhelming majority of states have elaborated and made more specific when applying the cause of action to particular cases. For instance, a useful
starting point for enunciating extremely outrageous conduct is
the Restatement and many courts' articulation of conduct which
exceeds all bounds that could be tolerated by a reasonable society.5 A valuable point of departure for defining severe mental
distress would correspondingly be the ideas included in comment
j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second), some aspects of which
the Sacco court reproduced verbatim and apparently adopted. 6
The alternative proposed would simultaneously be clearer,
easier for appellate and trial judges to apply, and more precise,
while it would resemble more closely the legal standards that
govern the tort in many other states. The option would also be
more responsive to certain public policy problems, namely protecting defendants against unlimited liability and those parties
and courts against a possible flood of fraudulent or fictitious
claims, which have made some judges reluctant to recognize the
IIMD tort. Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court expressed concern about these very policy difficulties, even as the requirements relating to the cause of action that the court enunciated
could ironically encourage the complications.
Because the Montana Supreme Court has substantially
clarified the law pertaining to the independent cause of action
for IIMD in the Sacco opinion, but some problems remain, the

5. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A2d 611, 613 (Md. 1977); Siliznoff, 240 P.2d
at 284-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1964); see also Foster, 254
Mont. at 128-29, 835 P.2d at 728.
6. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 237, 896 P.2d at 426, 428.
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Sacco decision warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that
effort. I first briefly examine relevant historical information. The
paper then evaluates Sacco. Finding that the Montana Supreme
Court has greatly improved the law governing IIMD, I afford
suggestions which should additionally clarify this complex cause
of action.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
MENTAL DISTRESS TORT

A. National Developments

The American Law Institute (ALI), when drafting the First
Restatement of Torts, stated that the interest in emotional and
mental tranquillity alone was not significant enough to warrant
recognition of a cause of action for its violation. 7 The ALI adopted a 1948 Supplement to the Restatement in which it recognized
an independent cause of action for IIMD. 8 The Institute reversed
its earlier position, finding that the "interest in freedom from
severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient importance
to require others to refrain from conduct intended to invade it. "9
The ALI, when prescribing the Restatement (Second) in 1965,
retained liability for extreme and outrageous conduct and left
open the possibility of the tort's additional expansion. 10
The California Supreme Court, in the landmark Siliznoff
case, became the first jurisdiction in the United States to recognize the independent cause of action in 1952. 11 A clear majority
of states in the nation now recognizes the independent cause of
action. 12 Most do not require that physical consequences attend
the mental distress that plaintiffs suffer, although some states
have restricted the tort's application to circumstances in which

7. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1934); see also Siliznoff, 240 P.2d
at 285; see generally Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous
Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982) (considering the definition of outrageousness
and the practical difficulty of the IIMD cause of action and supplying the relevant
history of the tort).
8. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948); see also JOHN W. WADE ET
AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 51 n.7 (9th ed.
1994); Siliznoff, 240 P.2d at 285-86.
9. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (Supp. 1948).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 caveat (1964).
11. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
12. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613 & n.1 (Md. 1977); Givelber, supra
note 7, at 43 & n.9.
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plaintiffs could prove physical harm 13 and other jurisdictions
have seemed more comfortable when physical injuries accompanied the mental suffering. 14
Most states articulate the cause of action in terms of two
principal elements-extremely outrageous conduct and severe
mental distress-which are elevated. Many jurisdictions define
extremely outrageous conduct as behavior that exceeds all
bounds tolerated by a reasonable society. Numerous courts also
recognize two major types of cases which satisfy this definition.
One category of suits implicates "abuse of relation," usually respecting economic or physical power; much of this litigation is
between employees and employers, tenants and landlords, and
insured individuals and insurers. 15 The other classification involves a plaintiff who is particularly vulnerable to suffering
mental distress and a defendant who knows of, and plays upon,
that special susceptibility. 16
The facts in Harris v. Jones 11 afford a classic illustration of
these two categories. In that case, the plaintiff was a twenty-six
year old assembly-line worker with a high school education who
had stuttered all of his life. 18 Defendants were General Motors
and its supervisory employee, Jones, who taunted Harris by
mimicking his stuttering some thirty times in a five-month period, even though Jones knew that his actions would exacerbate
Harris' condition. 19 Beyond these two relatively clear classifications, courts have encountered considerable difficulty in defining
with specificity what constitutes extremely outrageous conduct.
This means that the standard can be a highly generalized one
which judges and juries may interpret differently in specific
states and even within particular jurisdictions.
Severe mental distress, the second major element of the
cause of action, is also rather difficult to define. Most courts
treat the standard as an elevated one, and many states apply

13. See, e.g, Duty v. General Fin. Co., 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. 1952).
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
15. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977) (employer-employee);
Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1964).
16. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Korbin v.
Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1964).
17. 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977).
18. Harris, 380 A.2d at 612.
19. Id.
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formulations which draw on the language in comment j, Section
46 of the Restatement (Second). This comment and many courts
agree that the distress must be extreme, out of the ordinary, or
so serious that reasonable people could not endure it. 20 The Restatement and courts also speak in terms of severely disabling
distress 21 and of ''highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as
fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." 22

B. Montana Developments
The ongms and development of the independent cause of
action for IIMD warrant relatively limited treatment in this
essay for several reasons. Other writers in earlier issues of this
journal have examined considerable, relevant background. 23
Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court has addressed the concept of mental distress in numerous contexts. A small number of
the cases, however, involved IIMD, and the court only recognized
the independent cause of action in a few recent cases, while it
deemed the facts in none of them sufficient to support a cause of
action.
Johnson v. Supersave Markets 24 technically involved negligent, not intentional, infliction of mental distress, but the decision warrants analysis because subsequent cases, including
Sacco, which involve IIMD specifically mention or allude to
Johnson. In Johnson, the Montana Supreme Court primarily
treated mental distress as an element of damages, stating that
plaintiff could recover when "tortious conduct results in a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes a
significant impact upon the person of the plaintiff."25 In several
subsequent cases, the Montana Supreme Court recognized the

20. See, e.g., Deitsch v. Tillary, 833 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Ark. 1992); Vicnire v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Harris v. Jones,
380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Sacco, 271 Mont.
at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
23. Randy J. Cox & Cynthia H. Shott, Boldly Into the Fog: Limiting Rights of
Recovery for lnfiiction of Emotional Distress, 53 MONT. L. REV. 197 (1992); Francis X.
Clinch & Jodie L. Johnson, Compensation of Emotional Distress in Montana: Distinctions Between Bystanders and Direct Victims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 479 (1986).
24. 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984).
25. Johnson, 211 Mont. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213.
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existence of an independent cause of action of IIMD;26 however,
the factual circumstances presented in those lawsuits would not
substantiate a finding of liability. 27
Ill. ANALYSIS OF SACCO
A. Descriptive Analysis

In the Sacco case, plaintiff alleged that defendants, who
were her former employers, had falsely supplied to the local
police information claiming that she had "stolen proof sheets and
photographs from" the defendant newspaper's offices. 28 Plaintiff
also asserted that defendants conspired to bring a criminal prosecution against her, swore out a complaint against her which
they knew was false, and falsely informed plaintiff's new employer that she had stolen from defendants. 29 Plaintiff claimed that
defendants had harmed her reputation and caused her mental
anguish. One of the five counts included in plaintiff's complaint
alleged that defendants had intentionally caused her emotional
distress.
The Sacco opinion comprehensively treated the independent
causes of action for negligent and intentional infliction of mental
distress. The Montana Supreme Court initially examined the
factual and procedural background of the case and then considered the count alleging a civil rights violation. The court next
evaluated the tort of mental distress, discussing first the negligent infliction and secondly the intentional infliction cause of
action. The Montana Supreme Court recognized both claims as
independent causes of action. Because the focus of this essay is
IIMD, I only explore the court's treatment of negligent infliction
of mental distress, insofar as it informs understanding of judicial
application of the IIMD tort. For example, certain public policy
concepts and the examination of severe mental distress which
the Montana Supreme Court included in its discussion of the
negligent infliction cause of action are equally applicable to
IIMD. When those ideas can fairly be applied to the intentional
infliction tort, I attempt to do so.
In specifically treating IIMD, the court first reviewed three
recent cases which it found to "stand for the proposition that in-

26.
27.
28.
29.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Sacco, 271 Mont. at 214, 896 P.2d at 414.
Id. at 214, 896 P.2d at 414.
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tentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized and can be
pled as a separate cause of action in the courts of Montana."30
The Montana Supreme Court then explained the respective responsibilities of the judge and jury in mental distress suits. It
stated that the trial judge must initially ascertain whether the
"plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to support a prima
facie case for" IIMD. 31 The jury must subsequently decide
whether the defendant in fact committed the mental distress tort
by consulting the evidence introduced. 32
The Montana Supreme Court next found that the traditional
approach to IIMD could not be harmonized with the new standard which it had enunciated in recognizing the negligent infliction cause of action. 33 The court, therefore, determined that
it was preferable to require that plaintiffs prove the identical
basic elements in both torts; there will be an independent cause
of action for IIMD when "serious or severe emotional distress to
the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's intentional act or omission."34
The Montana Supreme Court rationalized in several ways
its decision to impose the same essential proof requirements on
plaintiffs who pursue both causes of action. The court stated that
demanding an intentionally injured plaintiff to show that
defendant's behavior was extreme and outrageous would place
the justices in the "untenable position of requiring a higher standard of proof by plaintiffs" who pled intentional, than who pied
negligent, infliction. 35 The court derived support for its determination to impose identical proof demands in the two types of
mental distress cases from Johnson v. Supersave Market. 36 The
Montana Supreme Court repeated the rule that it gleaned from
30. Id. at 235-36, 896 P.2d at 426-27; see also supra note 2; Lenee v. Hagadone
Invest. Co., 258 Mont. 433, 444-45, 853 P.2d 1230, 1237-38 (1993); Davis v. Church
of Jesus Christ, 258 Mont. 286, 293-94, 852 P.2d 640, 644-45 (1993); Lueck v. UPS,
258 Mont. 2, 11, 851 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1993). It is interesting that nearly all of
these cases involved the employment relationship, a phenomenon that was apparently
driven by passage of the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (1995); see generally D. P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994).
31. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427 (quoting Doohan v. Big Fork Sch.
Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 142, 805 P.2d 1354, 1365 (1991)).
32. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427.
33. Id. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427-28.
34. Id. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428.
35. Id. at 237, 896 P.2d at 427-28.
36. 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984); Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237-38, 896 P.2d
at 428.
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Johnson:
[D]amages for emotional distress are compensatory and therefore, the focus should be on the reasonable foreseeability that
plaintiffs serious or severe emotional distress was the consequence of the defendant's act or omission .... The defendant's
culpability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress is
"more properly considered when addressing the subject of punitive damages." 37

The court concluded that the possibility of awarding punitive
damages is the proper way to address the culpability and intentional character of the defendant's behavior in an IIMD case. 38
The Montana Supreme Court's decision to require identical
proof in negligent and intentional infliction cases departs significantly from the approach that the vast majority of jurisdictions
in the United States and the Restatement follow. Most courts
and the Restatement require a plaintiff to prove that a
defendant's intentional "extreme and outrageous conduct 'going
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community'"39
caused plaintiffs severe mental distress. These jurisdictions and
the Restatement have imposed this requirement principally to
serve as a guarantee that the plaintiff has suffered actual harm
and as a safeguard against fraudulent and frivolous claims.
The Montana Supreme Court partially responded to these
ideas and defended its decision to delete the extremely outrageous conduct element by enunciating the severe mental distress
element of the tort. The court imposed on a plaintiff the requirement to "prove that the emotional distress suffered is 'serious' or
'severe' in order to warrant recovery."40 It defined serious or
severe distress by using and ostensibly adopting the explanation
in comment j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second).
This articulation essentially states that the distress must be
so severe that reasonable individuals could not be expected to
endure it. 41 The Restatement provides that severe mental dis-

37. Sacco, 271 Mont at 238, 896 P.2d at 428 (quoting Johnson, 211 Mont. at
472, 696 P.2d at 213).
38. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 238, 896 P.2d at 428.
39. Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 117, 128-29, 835 P.2d 720, 728 (1992);
see also supra notes 5, 14-16 and accompanying text; Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236-37,
896 P.2d at 427 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1964)).
40. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 233, 896 P.2d at 426.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
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tress "includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as
fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."42 The Restatement makes the intensity and duration of the distress "factors to
be considered in determining its severity."43 The Restatement
adds that the distress must be reasonable and that recovery for
unreasonable or exaggerated distress will only be permitted
when it results from a special susceptibility of which defendant
was aware. 44
The Montana Supreme Court responded to the ideas about
insuring that plaintiff has suffered real injury and guarding
against false or frivolous lawsuits with the assertion that the
requirement of serious or severe mental distress "alleviates any
concern over a floodgate of claims, particularly fraudulent
claims. "45 The court correspondingly stated that limiting recovery to situations in which "plaintiff's serious or severe emotional
distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's intentional act or omission alleviates the concern
that defendants will be exposed to unlimited liability."46
The Montana Supreme Court concluded the section of the
Sacco opinion which articulated the IIMD cause of action with a
brief summary. The court reiterated the elements of the mental
distress tort which it had enunciated, that serious or severe
mental distress would be defined by reference to comment j of
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second), and the respective responsibilities of the judge and jury in these cases. 47
The Montana Supreme Court also elaborated upon certain
ideas relevant to IIMD in the summary. The court explained that
the difference between the intentional and negligent causes of
action is in the "nature and culpability of the defendant's conduct" not in the torts' elements. 48 The Montana Supreme Court
stated that this distinction meant that a plaintiff who pleads

42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426; Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ, 258 Mont. 286, 30607, 852 P.2d 640, 652-53 (1993) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting); First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark, 236 Mont. 195, 206, 771 P.2d 84, 91 (1989).
45. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 239, 896 P.2d at 429.
48. Id. at 238-39, 896 P.2d at 429.
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IIMD might request punitive damages under the Montana Code
section providing therefor to "address the culpability of the
defendant's conduct."49

B. Commentary
1. Improvements

Several significant aspects of the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Sacco constitute improvements in the Montana law of
IIMD. The court properly recognized that plaintiffs can plead
and prove an independent cause of action for IIMD. It also correctly articulated the severe mental distress element of the claim
by relying substantially on comment j of Section 46 of the Restatement (Second). Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court
accurately delineated the roles of the trial judge and the jury in
IIMD litigation. Furthermore, the court appropriately evinced
concern about a floodgate of suits, especially fraudulent cases,
and about the possibility of exposing defendants to unlimited
liability by suggesting that its articulation of the severe mental
distress element would be responsive to these potential problems.
2. Areas of Potential Confusion

A few important features of the Sacco opinion remain unclear or could be difficult for the Montana Supreme Court, Montana district judges and juries to apply. Perhaps most significant
is the Montana Supreme Court's unnecessary omission of the
extremely outrageous conduct element. Courts in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions include this element and treat it as
the gravamen of the cause of action. The requirement's elevated
nature provides reasonable assurance that the defendant's behavior is egregious or at least out of the ordinary; that the conduct is sufficiently blameworthy to deserve punishment, an important purpose of the tort; that courts will not be inundated by
a flood of claims, especially fraudulent suits; and that defendants
will not be exposed to unlimited liability.
The elevated character of the severe mental distress element
affords similar assurance. Placing exclusive dependence on this
element, however, relies too substantially on the degree of harm
that the plaintiff has suffered, rather than the egregiousness of
49.

Id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (1995).
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the defendant's behavior. Moreover, such dependence appears
inadequate to treat the broad range of conduct that is at issue in
IIMD claims and seems to afford insufficient protection against
the possibility of a flood of suits and against the risk that defendants will be exposed to open-ended liability. Depending solely
on the severe mental distress element may also be inadequate to
resolve cases which are brought by plaintiffs who are very vulnerable to suffering emotional harm. The articulation of this
element by the Montana Supreme Court and in the Restatement
(Second) does provide for such parties with the reasonable person standard and by stating that individuals who are unduly
sensitive as to their dignity will be unable to recover. 50
The omission of the extremely outrageous conduct element
could also undercut important purposes of the IIMD cause of
action. Significant objectives of this tort are to punish, deter, and
ostensibly prevent the repetition of, certain kinds of behavior
that the society considers intolerable, particularly by affording
notice to individuals who might otherwise engage in such activity. The deletion of the extremely outrageous conduct element
potentially deprives actors of guidance about what type of behavior will expose them to liability for commission of the IIMD tort.
The Montana Supreme Court stated that a defendant can be
found liable for any intentional act or omission which this party
could reasonably foresee would cause the plaintiff severe mental
distress. That articulation lacks adequate rigor. The court correspondingly deleted the intentional element of the cause of action-the requirement that a defendant know with substantial
certainty that defendant's act or omission will cause some result
which the law regards as inappropriate. Nearly all jurisdictions
include this as a significant element of IIMD, and intent is a
fundamental prerequisite of intentional torts to persons and to
property. For example, a plaintiff can only hold a defendant
liable for battery, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew
with substantial certainty that defendant's behavior would lead
to offensive or harmful bodily contact with plaintiff. The Sacco
court, in requiring only that a defendant reasonably foresee,
rather than know with substantial certainty, that defendant's
conduct would cause the plaintiff severe mental distress, imported a concept traditionally applied to negligence and substituted
it for a concept traditionally applied to intentional torts.
A related area of confusion involves the Montana Supreme

50.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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Court's attempt to justify its assimilation of the IIMD cause of
action to the negligent infliction tort. This confusion arises partly
from the court's statements that the difference between the two
versions lies in the "nature and culpability of the defendant's
conduct," so that plaintiffs alleging IIMD may request punitive
damages to address culpability, and that mental distress damages are compensatory and, therefore, the focus should be on reasonable foreseeability. 51 With all due respect, courts have traditionally stated that compensatory and punitive damages may
be awarded for either intentionally or negligently inflicted mental distress when the elements of the respective torts or the
requirements of applicable punitive damages statutes are satisfied. Plaintiffs will more frequently recover punitive damages in
intentional, than negligent, infliction cases because the traditional judicial articulation of the extremely outrageous conduct element of IIMD more closely resembles the type of behavior which
supports punitive damage awards.
The extremely outrageous conduct element as traditionally
applied and the kind of activity identified as deserving punishment in the Montana punitive damages statute, however, are not
identical. Considerable behavior that could satisfy the extremely
outrageous conduct element might not constitute actual fraud or
actual malice as required by the Montana legislation. 52 In comparison, the behavior of a defendant which is at issue in negligent infliction of mental distress cases may occasionally support
punitive damages awards. For example, the drunk driver who
seriously injures schoolchildren by speeding through a school
zone or by striking a school bus could be liable to parents who
witnessed these accidents for negligent infliction of mental distress and perhaps for punitive damages.
It is easy to understand why numerous courts and commentators have confused the concepts examined above. This area of
substantive law is relatively nascent, complex and unclear. The
Montana Supreme Court was apparently exhibiting a laudable
concern for facilitating recovery by plaintiffs who have suffered
mental distress that defendants have negligently or intentionally
inflicted. There is also a sense in which compensatory damages
seem to implicate reasonable foreseeability and punitive damages appear to implicate intent because negligent behavior is gen-

51.
52.

See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 239, 896 P.2d at 429.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (1995).
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erally less reprehensible than intentional conduct. 53 Moreover,
the extremely outrageous conduct element of IIMD is quite general and has defied very precise definition, leading numerous
courts to express or evince discomfort with the open-ended character of this aspect of the tort.
I believe, however, that the preferable approach is to maintain distinct causes of action, and to articulate different elements, for negligent and intentional infliction of mental distress.
It is also advisable to retain the intent, rather than foreseeability, and the extremely outrageous conduct elements of IIMD
which the vast majority of courts in the country have traditionally applied. Moreover, plaintiffs should be able to recover punitive
damages in negligent as well as intentional infliction cases when
the defendant's behavior satisfies the requirements imposed in
the punitive damages statute.
The Montana Supreme Court should continue relying on the
severe mental distress element of the tort as articulated in
Sacco, which the court principally derived from the Restatement
(Second). The Montana Supreme Court may want to afford additional guidance on those aspects of the Restatement formulation
which trial judges should apply in particular situations, while
district judges must concomitantly decide what features of the
Restatement enunciation apply to specific cases, pending the receipt of additional instruction. For example, highly unpleasant
mental reactions, such as horror, differ substantially from chagrin and worry. 54
The broad range of factual circumstances that can be at
issue in IIMD causes of action, however, could complicate efforts
to supply greater specificity. It may also be advisable for district
judges to have the flexibility that a multifaceted standard affords. For instance, when a defendant has participated in very
egregious conduct, judges might require less by way of the severity of mental distress which the plaintiff has suffered.
In sum, the Montana Supreme Court has significantly improved the application of the law of IIMD in Montana with issuance of the Sacco opinion. The court correctly recognized the
independent cause of action, properly articulated the severe
mental distress element, and appropriately delineated the respective roles of the judge and jury in IIMD cases. There is some
remaining confusion in the jurisprudence of IIMD, particularly

53.
54.

See Givelber, supra note 7, at 54-55.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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regarding deletion of the intent and extremely outrageous conduct elements and treatment of the concept of punitive damages.
The final section of this essay, therefore, affords several suggestions which are principally intended to clarify ideas that could
lead to confusion in the future. The recommendations warrant
relatively brief examination here because most of the proposals
have been specifically mentioned or implicitly addressed above.
Nonetheless, a number of the concepts require additional substantiation and some deserve elaboration.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS

FOR

THE FuTURE

The Montana Supreme Court should retain those features of
the Sacco decision which the above analysis suggested are clear
and appropriate. These aspects include the court's articulation of
the respective roles of the trial judge and the jury in IIMD cases
and its enunciation of the severe mental distress element of the
tort. They also encompass the Montana Supreme Court's apparent subscription to important underlying public policy reasons
for the independent cause of action, such as facilitating plaintiffs'
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages and punishing
and deterring defendants' egregious behavior and the court's
expression of concern about a flood of fraudulent claims and
about exposing defendants to unlimited liability.
The Montana Supreme Court and district judges might want
to refine the articulation of the severe mental distress element of
the IIMD tort. For instance, they could identify precisely which
aspects of the multifaceted Restatement (Second) formulation
should apply. Nonetheless, the preferable approach may be to
retain the enunciation in Sacco, with sensitive case-by-case district judge application of the specific factors which seem most
appropriate in particular cases. This could be better because trial
judges might need the flexibility afforded by those features of the
Restatement that the Sacco court reproduced and seemingly
adopted.
The Montana Supreme Court should modify the aspects of
the Sacco opinion which the above evaluation indicated are unnecessary or confusing. Most important, the court should include
the intent and extremely outrageous elements of the cause of
action in the Montana articulation. The Montana Supreme Court
can rely substantially on those elements as enunciated in the
Restatement (Second) and by many other state supreme courts.
For example, extremely outrageous conduct could be defined in
terms of behavior that exceeds all bounds tolerated in a civilized
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society. If that articulation is overly broad, the Montana Supreme Court can derive greater specificity from the two major
categories, abuse of relation and special susceptibility, into which
numerous IIMD cases fit. Reliance on the intent element enunciated in terms of the classic formulation of knowledge with substantial certainty means that the court should delete the concept
of reasonable foreseeability because it more properly applies to
negligence.
The Montana Supreme Court should also clarify the treatment of punitive damages in the Sacco decision. It ought to state
clearly that a plaintiff may seek and recover punitive damages
for intentionally and negligently inflicted harm when the plaintiff proves that the defendant participated in conduct which
satisfies the standards of actual malice or actual fraud prescribed in the Montana punitive damages statute.
The Montana Supreme Court should clarify the jurisprudence of IIMD in these ways for all of the reasons specifically
expressed and implicitly stated already. Several ideas treated
above deserve elaboration, while additional concepts support the
recommendations that I have offered. One important justification
is that the modifications proposed would align the Montana
jurisprudence of IIMD more closely with the law applied by most
other jurisdictions in the United States and with the Restatement (Second).
I am not suggesting that Montana subscribe to the national
articulation of IIMD merely because many states have done so. I
simply believe that the jurisprudence suggested will be clearer,
and easier for the Montana Supreme Court, district judges and
juries to apply, than the enunciation in Sacco. Moreover, the
recommendations afforded will yield similar substantive results
in that deserving plaintiffs should be able to recover with nearly
equal facility.
The changes suggested will also afford protection against the
possibility of a flood of litigation, especially involving fraud, and
the prospect that plaintiffs and their counsel will rely too substantially on the IIMD tort. Indeed, the cause of action as articulated in Sacco appears so open-ended and so easy to prove that
plaintiffs and their attorneys may be tempted to include a count
alleging IIMD in many cases in which the allegation would probably not be warranted under the cause of action as traditionally
enunciated. This possibility could confuse the law, lead to the
pursuit of unjustifiable claims, unnecessarily complicate cases,
and waste the resources of judges, lawyers, parties and juries.
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Finally, certain of these recommendations should also clarify and
make more cohesive the law of intentional torts and the broader
substantive area of torts in Montana.
V. CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court has properly recognized the
independent cause of action for intentional infliction of mental
distress in the important Sacco case. The court has appropriately
treated numerous aspects of the law of the mental distress tort;
however, certain features of the decision are unclear. The court
should promptly clarify those dimensions of the opinion which
remain confused, thereby facilitating application of the IIMD
cause of action in Montana.

